The California Legislature has the duty under Article IX, section 1 under the California Constitution to use “all suitable means” to promote education “which is essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people.” However, trampling a parent’s Free Exercise Rights is not a suitable means. Thus to interpret the statute in such a way as to severely restrict Christian parents’ rights to home-school their children violates the constitutional mandate.
Following a period of national attention, the Washington Board of Pharmacy issued a regulation that effectively excluded a right of conscience for pharmacists who could not fill Plan B prescriptions because of their religious convictions. One of the arguments that Appellees presented in their Motion for Preliminary Injunction was that the Board was denying pharmacists the same fundamental right that other health care professionals enjoyed in contravention of the two statutes, and that denial was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The District Court erred because a Heckler’s Veto can not be employed to foreclose Freedom of Speech. In addition, the District Court erred because school administrators are diluting Nuxoll’s message by restricting his chosen message, and because school officials are compelling speech by refusing to allow Nuxoll to express any message which is not tolerant of homosexuality. Finally, the District Court erred because it misconstrued several of this court’s precedents.
The District Court erred in treating numerous “ultimate” facts and sociological judgments as findings of fact. This court should reverse the District Court because the fundamental right to marry only includes opposite-sex marriage. The District Court also erred in Citing Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence.
The District Court should be reversed in the following instances: First, Congress’s primary purpose was reducing the military forces and encouraging early retirement; Second, the Secretary of Defense acted Ultra Vires in promulgating the regulation of organizations that former service personnel could work.
The District Court erred when it held that Mr. Byrne withdrew his facial challenge to the statute and regulations at the preliminary injunction stage. Second, Amicus expands upon Mr. Byrne’s discussion regarding the statute’s viewpoint discrimination. Amicus’s argument is compatible with, but different from, Mr. Byrne’s argument concerning viewpoint discrimination.
Whether the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, which affords custody and visitation orders full faith and credit, or the Defense of Marriage Act, which does not require full faith and credit be afforded to rights arising from same-sex unions treated as marriage, controls when Virginia is asked to give full faith and credit to Vermont parentage and custody rights arising from a Vermont civil union insofar as Virginia’s laws expressly declare the civil union “void in all respects.”
First, the District Court was incorrect in holding that “since neither term is defined, the difference in scienter standards creates uncertainty in COPA’s application and renders the terms vague.” The Supreme Court has held “that the language of the statutes that Congress enacts provides ‘the most reliable evidence of its intent.’”
Second, this court can review the District Court’s findings of fact because courts must engage in an independent review of the record when, as here, errors of law have infected factual findings.
Finally, the ACLU’s argument in this case is inconsistent with its argument to the Supreme Court in United States v. American Library Association regarding computer filtration software.
First, Oklahoma is not required to recognize Canadian same-sex marriages because the text and the surrounding context of the term “spouse” demonstrates that only heterosexual marriage was in view. Second, Oklahoma is not required to recognize Canadian same-sex marriages because the history and negotiations and the practical construction of the parties of the term “spouse” demonstrates that only heterosexual marriage was in view.
This court should affirm the Court of Appeal’s ruling because the fundamental right to marry only includes opposite-sex marriage.